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Risk monitoring is a fundamental part of risk management that allows detecting changes that might affect the risk
consequences and their likelihood. To be effective, the process requires storing the risk information into a so-called
risk register. This paper presents an implementation that is realized in form of a relational database. We present the
complete table schema of the database and discuss what motivated the different features. We believe that certain
aspects of our schema improve its application in comparison to related works. A noteworthy characteristic is the
separation of the risk scenarios and risk analyses in different tables. This feature relates to the fact that the same
scenario can be assessed within multiple analyses, in which individual circumstances may result in different risk
levels. Moreover, different analyses can apply distinct risk criteria. Thus, the analysis-specific criterion must be
stored in the database as a risk matrix. A risk scenario includes an entity or item that is the subject being considered
in that scenario. This subject can be a system or organization or a subpart of a system or organization. Due to this
reason, the schema allows a hierarchical categorization of entities. The developed schema also employs ideas from
the object-oriented programming approach, which allows entities to inherit already defined risk scenarios. This paper
further presents a browser based user interface to access the database.
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1. Introduction
According to Woods (2015), a system’s ability for
sustained adaptability is one of the core concepts
of resilience. This view is backed by the risk
management vocabulary standard ISO (2009) that
defines resilience solely as the ”adaptive capac-
ity of an organization in a complex and chang-
ing environment”. Over the system’s life cycle,
changes may occur in any assumptions, boundary
conditions, operations conditions, or context of
use. When these changes affect the risk level, they
trigger the need to adapt. In the risk management
context, the detection of changes that might affect
the risk consequences and their likelihood is one
part of risk monitoring ISO (2009). In this task,
the acquired information on changes is employed
for reviewing the existing risk controlling and
mitigation measures to ensure that they remain
sufficient. To be effective, the task requires com-
paring the former risk assessment results to the
present situation. For this purpose, results of risk
assessments are recorded in a so-called risk regis-
ter ISO (2009). However, this is not the only use
case for such a register. It can also be employed for
expanding, maintaining, and sharing knowledge
among different systems or organizations.
This paper presents a risk registry implementa-
tion that is realized in form of a relational database
(DB). Section 2 presents a short literature review
and the motivation for our DB. Section 3 describes
the DB schema and what motivated the different
features. Section 4 describes the intended use of
the DB and shows an User Interface (UI) to access
the information, before conclusions in section 5.
2. Background and Motivation
Whipple and Pitblado (2009) show an example
from the chemical and petroleum industries that
emphasizes the centralized role of the risk registry.
The companies process for creating a risk registry
is initiated by risk identification, which fills the
registry with risk information. The controls to
modify the risks are then defined for the highest
risks. The value of the register is in communicat-
ing the risks to the stakeholders and storing the
results to facilitate continuous risk reduction.
The risk registers have also been criticized.
Drummond (2011) states that no register can be
fully comprehensive or accurate, and by no means
listing a risk in a register with a mitigation mea-
sure mean that the risk is actually in control. Yet,
having all this information listed in a register may
create a false sense of security and lead managers
unaware of uncertainties. Kutsch and Hall (2010)
go further and accuse that sometimes the risk
information is treated with deliberate ignorance.
In response, Budzier (2011) argues that the issues
found by Drummond (2011) are social, cultural,
and organizational rather than caused by the risk
registers. He sees them as valuable tools to com-
municate the current understanding of risks within
an organization and to prioritize the risk mitiga-
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tion efforts.
Although a risk registry database is a known
concept, an article by Patterson and Neailey
(2002) found that only a few studies have been
made on their development and construction.
They referred to an earlier study by Crossland
et al. (1998) to state that, at that time, about
78% of the computerized risk registers were de-
veloping within individual organizations, and their
design was undisclosed. We believe that the de-
sign of these registers is rather simple. For ex-
ample, Whipple and Pitblado (2009) build their
register on spreadsheet software. After the article
by Patterson and Neailey (2002), only some others
have been published on risk registers development
and construction. We found an article by Bur-
car Dunović et al. (2013) and articles linked to
an EU-funded TOSCA study, of which Leva et al.
(2017) is the latest.
Existing literature gives a rather simple formu-
lation for risk registries. None of the cited exam-
ples differ significantly from the description given
in Leva et al. (2017), where the core components
contain:
Risk ID A unique identification (IDa) number for
each risk,
Risk Description a concise description or title
for the risk,
Risk ranking a quantification of the risk, based
on severity and likelihood,
Owner the person responsible for managing the
risk and ensuring actions against it are
completed,
Actions a list of actions for each risk, and
Dates The date of entry and modification should
be held for each risk to assist with
reviews. Action target and completion
dates should also be included.
The risk ranking is derived based on the likelihood
and consequences of the risk. They have prede-
fined categories, as organizations tend to standard-
ize their approaches. Allowing individual analyses
to use distinct risk criteria would go against this
idea. Also, Patterson and Neailey (2002) consider
an individual use case where all risks can be de-
fined using a single criterion for severity and like-
lihood. The study by Whipple and Pitblado (2009)
was in-fact motivated by the need to develop a
common risk criterion for an oil company.
One reason why a common risk criteria works
in the previous examples was that they consid-
ered that each project should have their own risk
registry. In slight contrast, Burcar Dunović et al.
(2013) presented a system where risk registries
are formed for individual projects that are later
aThis acronym is later is used for marking the primary and
foreign key values in our schema. In a relational database, a
primary key uniquely identifies each record in a table.
combined in a central risk registry. Only in their
case, it is not clear if the criteria are predefined.
Risk criteria are specific for organizations and
use cases. For example, NAVAIR (2005) defines
failure rates in relation to flight hours and con-
sequences in terms of personnel injuries, aircraft
damage, or mission success. This is different
compared to the criteria defined for submarine
pipelines, where severity is defined in terms of
injuries, and environmental, economic, or political
consequences DNV (2013). The acceptable failure
probabilities depend partially on the type of fluid
carried in the pipeline, as fluid’s potential toxicity
and flammability will increase the severity of an
accident.
In the cited examples, the registry was mainly
designed to be used by a single project. There are
few key issues that has to be considered in a case
where multiple analyses are stored in the registry.
The same scenario can be assessed within mul-
tiple analyses, in which individual circumstances
may result in different risk levels. The analyses
may use a specific risk criterion and terminology.
There may also be other analysis specific informa-
tion that is not usually added to a risk analysis.
Section 3 presents our implementation of a DB
schema that attempts to address these questions,
while also employing software engineering meth-
ods to aid data storing.
3. Database Schema
This section describes and motivates the differ-
ent aspects of our table schema that is shown in
Fig. 1. Section 3.1 describes the key ideas of the
DB. Section 3.2 describes how risk scenarios are
stored in the ScenarioTable, and what information
is stored in Entity, Domain, and Example tables.
Section 3.3 introduces the storing of individual
analyses and their source documentation. Finally,
section 3.4 describes how analysis-specific risk
matrices are stored in the DB.
3.1. Description of key features
Our schema is designed for storing multiple sepa-
rate risk assessments. This led us to store the risk
scenarios and risk analyses in different tables. As
the same scenario can be assessed within multiple
analyses, in which individual circumstances may
result in different risk levels. The analyses may
also use a specific risk criterion. We concluded
that trying to present these criteria using some
common risk criterion would distort the original
information. Especially as organizations have dif-
ferent levels of risk acceptance. So, we decided to
store the analyses-specific risk matrices and crite-
ria in the DB. We did not find this concept used
in other risk registers. As their main focus was
on individual projects and use of distinct criteria
in different analyses would not allow forming a
standard one for an organization.
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Fig. 1. Table schema of the proposed risk register database. The letter P stands for the primary key and F for a
foreign key. The foreign key relations are also defined with arrows.
Our schema is mainly for knowledge man-
agement rather than project management, infor-
mation like the risk owner, mitigation plan, or
project-specific dates are not included as speci-
fied columns. Different analyses are too distinct
for defining tables that contain all the required
columns for defining the information. However,
this information can still be added to the DB, as
many tables in the schema allow users to store
the information in the JavaScript Object Notation
(JSON) data format. It allows among other things
storing information in freely defined name/value
pairs Bray (2017). We also provide a link to the
source documentation of an analysis, which may
contain additional information.
The schema further employs some technical
methods to aid data storing. For example, a risk
scenario includes an entity or item that is the sub-
ject being considered in a risk scenario. This sub-
ject can be a system or organization or a subpart
of a system or organization. Due to this reason,
the schema allows a hierarchical categorization
of entities. The developed schema also employs
ideas from the object-oriented programming ap-
proach Hillar (2015), which allows entities to in-
herit already defined risk scenarios. This can also
be used in the case where various terms are used to
describe similar entity in different organizations.
Section 3.2.2 shows an example where ”boat” and
”ship” are both defined as ”watercraft”. Search-
ing for one term allows user to find the related
ones. This approach can be further used for defin-
ing synonyms by having the synonym terms to




In our schema, the principal components of a risk
scenario are the entity or item that is the sub-
ject being considered in a risk scenario, and the
description of the scenario. A simple example is
”Ship sinks.”, where the ship is the subject and
sinking is the risk. This information is stored in
the ScenarioTable, which contains the following
columns:
ScenarioID forms the primary key with the En-
tityID,
EntityID foreign key from the EntityTable,
DomainID foreign key from the DomainTable,
Description free text that describes the risk sce-
nario, and
ScenarioData data related to the scenario that is
stored in the JSON format.
The ScenarioID and the EntityID form a com-
posite primary key. This feature is related to
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the object-oriented programming approach Hillar
(2015). In this approach, an object may have a
super-type from which the object inherits features
that are defined for the super-type. For example,
ships and boats are both watercraft and will in-
herit the sinking scenario if it is defined for the
watercraft. In some cases, the object must alter the
definition that has been made for the super-type.
In these cases, the object-specific definition over-
rides the super-type’s definition. In the schema, if
an entity has a super-type, it will automatically
inherit the risk scenarios that have been defined
for the super-type. If a risk scenario is significantly
different from the super-type’s scenario, the in-
herited scenario can be overridden. This is done
by creating a primary key with a ScenarioID that
is defined for the super-type in combination with
the entity’s EntityID. This way, the composite
primary key enables entities to override super-
type’s risk scenarios. The inheritance aspects are
clarified in section 3.2.2.
The EntityTable describes individual entities
and allows defining their hierarchy with a tech-
nique called adjacency list Celko (2012). The
table contains the following columns:
EntityID the primary key,
Name name of the entity,
Description free text that describes the entity,
and
Is Part Of a ”foreign” key from EntityTable that
allows defining hierarchies.
The Is Part Of column can contain the EntityID
of another entity of which the defined entity is a
part of. For example, a rudder is a part of a ship.
The super-types are defined in the separate Su-
perTypeTable. It contains two columns: EntityID,
and SuperType, which both are foreign keys from
the EntityTable. The columns also form a com-
posite primary key to ensure that each relation is
unique. Using a separate table enables multiple
inheritance of risk scenarios from several super-
types.
The DomainTable defines what type of risk a
scenario considers. For instance, a domain can be
personnel safety or security. The table contains
columns:
DomainID the primary key,
Name name of the domain,
Description free text that describes the domain,
and
Is SubType Of a ”foreign” key from the Do-
mainTable that allows defining hierar-
chies.
Similar to the EntityTable, the Is SubType Of
column allows defining hierarchies with the adja-
cency list technique. For example, cyber-security
is a sub-type of the security domain.
We considered that a short technical definition
of risk scenarios may be hard to comprehend.
Especially, if a person is not familiar with different
risk scenarios in the DB. Therefore, we borrowed
an idea from the pedagogy that values the use
of examples to aid learning Oliveira and Brown
(2016), and added a specific table for examples
where a risk scenario has been realized. These
examples can be news items or accident investi-
gation reports that help to connect risk scenarios
to real life.
Examples of risk scenarios are stored in the
ExampleTable. Having this information in a sep-
arate table allows defining multiple examples for
a single risk scenario. The table has columns:
ExampleID the primary key,
ScenarioID a foreign key from the Scenario-
Table,
EntityID also a foreign key from the Scenario-
Table, as that table has a composite pri-
mary key,
Title title of the report, and
ExampleData bibliographical information in
JSON format.
We cannot foresee what bibliographical informa-
tion is available for different reports. Therefore,
we allow users to input this information in the
JSON form. One can imagine that the information
could contain similar fields as the BibTeX format-
ting system Patashnik (1988).
3.2.2. Example of risk scenario inheritance
This example clarifies the concept of entities in-
heriting risk scenarios from their super-types. Wa-
tercraft, ships, and boats can be organized in a
class hierarchy shown in Fig. 2. This hierarchy
can be defined in the SuperTypeTable as shown in
Table 1. A simplified RiskScenarioTable shown in
Table 2 demonstrates how an entity can override
risk scenario description. By default, all the sub-
classes of the watercraft inherit the sinking sce-
nario. The cargo and passenger ships override the
scenario description with a more detailed one. The
description for the RMSb Titanic further overrides
the passenger ship’s scenario description.
Although the Titanic sank relatively slowly,
many of the passengers and crew had little chance
to survive. This aspect is significantly different
from most modern accidents. As two years after
the disaster, the First International Conference on
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) was held and intro-
duced several safety regulations, such as defining
the sufficient number of lifeboats for all persons
on board Phillips and Sirkar (2012). Had these
regulations been in place before the disaster, the
outcome could have been much less severe.
bRoyal Mail Ship
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Fig. 2. Example of a class hierarchy for watercraft.
Table 1. The example class hierarchy in the
SuperTypeTable. Unlike in the actual schema,








RMS Titanic Passenger ship
3.3. Individual risk analyses
In our schema, a risk analysis extends a risk sce-
nario by determining how likely it is and what are
its consequences. This information is then used
for assigning the risk level. A risk scenario can
be considered in multiple analyses, which may
result in different findings. Therefore, these results
must be stored in a different table from the scenar-
ios. The RiskAnalysesTable contains the following
columns:
AnalysisID the primary key,
ScenarioID a foreign key from the Scenario-
Table,
EntityID also a foreign key from the Scenario-
Table, as that table has a composite pri-
mary key,
RiskData information in JSON format,
RiskMatrixID a foreign key from the RiskMa-
trixTable,
ImpactID a foreign key from the CriteriaTable,
LikelihoodID a foreign key from the Criteria-
Table,
RiskID a foreign key from the CriteriaTable, and
ReportID a foreign key from the RiskReports-
Table.
The ScenarioID and EntityID link the analysis to
the scenario that was described in section 3.2. The
RiskMatrixID and foreign keys from the Crite-
riaTable link the analysis to a risk matrix, which
will be introduced in section 3.4. Although, a risk
matrix is linked to a defined criteria, this criteria
may be used in several other matrices. Therefore,
the RiskMatrixID is essential for determining the
specific risk matrix that is used in an analysis.
The ReportID links analysis to the RiskRe-
portsTable. In our view, the DB does not have to
provide the full information of individual analy-
ses. This can be provided in the source documents.
In any case, it is important to know where the
analysis information originated from. Thus, stor-
ing the details of sources provides traceability.
The RiskReportsTable is quite similar to the
ExampleTable that was introduced in section 3.2.
It contains columns:
AnalysisID the primary key,
Title title of the report, and
ReportData bibliographical or other information
in JSON format.
The table does not contain the AnalysisID, as we
foresee that there is just one primary report for
each analysis that is defined in the RiskAnalyses-
Table.
3.4. Risk matrices
This section describes how risk matrices can be
stored in the DB. We use a simple matrix shown
in Fig. 3 is used for describing what data is stored
in each table.
A risk matrix is in the RiskMatrixTable, which
contains columns:
RiskMatrixID the primary key,
Name name of the matrix,
xAxisID foreign key from the RiskAxisTable for
the x-axis,
yAxisID foreign key from the RiskAxisTable for
the y-axis, and
riskAxisID foreign key from the RiskAxisTable
for the risk categories.
Considering the example matrix, its name could
be the ”Simple matrix”, and in this case, the x-axis
is for consequences and the y-axis for likelihoods.
Axes are defined in the RiskAxisTable. It has the
following columns:
RiskAxisID the primary key,
Title Title of the axis,
Size the number of classification criteria of the
axis, and
CategoryID foreign key from the CategoryTable.
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Table 2. Example of a simplyfied RiskScenarioTable, where Entities override the inherited risk scenarios
with more detailed descriptions. Again for clarity, the names are shown instead of the ID numbers.
Scenario Entity Description
Sinking Watercraft Watercraft sinks
Sinking Cargo ship Cargo ship sinks endagering crew and cargo
Sinking Passenger ship Passenger ship sinks endangering the crew and passengers





































Fig. 3. Example of a risk matrix.
The number of classifiers for each axis can be
freely defined, but in this example, all of the axes
have three classifiers. So, their size is three. The
axis titles are displayed in Fig. 3. For example, the
title of the risk axis is ”Risk Level”.
The category determines the types of an axis.
This is done in the CategoryTable that has two
columns: CategoryID and Description. The cat-
egory can be ”likelihood”, ”consequences”, or
”risk”.
Defining the category is important as the clas-
sifier criteria are defined independently from axes
in the CriteriaTable. This table contains columns:
CriteriaID the primary key,
Classifier text that describes the criterion,
CriteriaData data in JSON form, and
CategoryID foreign key from the CategoryTable.
The classifiers are shown when a matrix is drawn.
In Fig. 3, ”Rare”, ”Likely”, and ”Common” are
the classifiers for the y-axis’s criteria. The schema
does not have a specific column for the color of
the risk levels or specific descriptions. These will
be stored in the JSON data.
The criteria are assigned to axes in the AxisCri-
teriaAllocationTable, which contains columns:
RiskAxisID a foreign key from the RiskAx-
isTable,
index the axis location of the allocated criterion,
and
CriteriaID a foreign key from the CriteriaTable.
The primary key is defined as a combination of
RiskAxisID and index to ensure that each index
location can have only one allocated criterion. The
criteria must be allocated to both coordinate axes
and the risk axis. The former allows drawing the
risk axis as seen on the bottom of Fig. 3.
The criteria have to be further assigned to each
element of the matrix to be able to display it.
This allocation is done in the MatrixCriteriaAllo-
cationTable. It contains columns:
RisksMatrixID a foreign key from the RiskAx-
isTable,
xIndex the axis location of the allocated crite-
rion,
yIndex the axis location of the allocated crite-
rion, and
CriteriaID a foreign key from the CriteriaTable.
The primary key is a composite of RisksMa-
trixID and the indexes. The purpose is to ensure
that each element of the risk matrix can have only
one assigned criterion.
The presented tables allow storing risk matri-
ces in the DB. The high degrees of freedom to
customize the size of the matrix and definitions
require a quite complex schema to define the fea-
tures.
4. Intended Use of the Database
4.1. Searching information
This section describes how information stored in
the DB can be browsed to attain knowledge of
identified risks. Authors foresee three main use
cases. In the first case, a user searches for in-
formation on specific entities, such as ships or
offshore wind turbines. This requires an ability to
query the EntityTable to see if the searched term
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is mentioned the Name or the Description of an
entity.
Once the user selects an entity, the UI shall
show all the scenarios it is involved in. This re-
quires showing 1) the scenarios that the entity
inherits from its super-types, and 2) the scenarios
defined for the sub-items of an entity, which are
defined as parts of the entity in the EntityTable. It
is also important to note that a scenario may occur
where the entity is not the subject of the scenario,
but is related to it. Showing this information for
a user requires querying the Descriptions in the
ScenarioTable in case of the Name of the entity is
mentioned in the text.
The second and third ways to access the infor-
mation involve the stored documentation. A user
may be interested to see what risk reports are
stored in the DB and what analyses these reports
contain. Browsing the reports requires querying
the RiskReportsTable and showing the analyses
requires querying the RiskAnalysesTable with a
specified ReportID. A user may also browse
through the stored examples and wants to see what
information the DB contains for the depicted sce-
nario. Browsing the examples requires querying
the ExampleTable, which contains the scenario
specific ScenarioID and EntityId to access more
information.
4.2. Browser based user interface
This section shows excerpts from the UI used for
accessing the information stored in the DB. This
also demonstrates the ability to store information
from multiple sources. Our examples are from a
master’s thesis by Mielniczek (2019) that studies
occupational safety of offshore wind farms, a risk
assessment of sub-sea power cables by Carbon
Trust (2015), and the National Risk Register by
HM Cabinet Office (2020).
Fig. 4 shows how the data is stored in the Risk-
AnalysesTable. For the case from Cabinet Office
(2020), the UI shows an extended information
including the risk matrix. At the time of writing
this paper, the UI is not fully finished, and the
authors are experimenting on what information
should be shown for the user in different views.
The issue caused by different analyses using
distinct risk criteria is clearly shown by Fig. 4.
Mielniczek (2019) uses both numbers and text to
define the criteria. Here we opted to show the text
definitions. Carbon Trust (2015) presents only nu-
meric definitions that are not otherwise defined in
the source document. Therefore, the numbers are
shown. Finally, the national risk register by Cabi-
net Office (2020) uses probabilities to define the
likelihoods. The risk levels are not defined, but
consequences have eight different definitions us-
ing different scales of impact.
In the case of the ”Level D”, the consequence
can be defined for examples on the economic scale
as one to ten billion pounds impact, or in terms
of electricity supply as a major disruption for one
million people that last more than 18 hours. The
document further uses several pages to describe
each risk scenario. These kinds of long descrip-
tions are not intended to be stored in our DB. For
this reason the DB stores the information on the
source document, which may contain this kind of
information.
5. Conclusions
This paper presented a database schema for a risk
register and a browser based UI to access the risk
information. The examples of risk registers found
in the literature survey were mainly designed for
risk management in projects. In contrast, our DB
is mainly intended for knowledge management
and storing multiple risk analyses. One conse-
quence of this is that the DB has to store several
distinct risk criteria and multiple analyses for a
same scenario. These requirements affected the
schema design. Our work will continue by im-
proving the UI and by employing the DB to its
intended use in our institution.
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